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Theoretically fiscal decentralisation is good for efficiency and 
equity in the economy based on the rationale that local governments, 
which are closer to citizens, are more efficient in the provisioning of 
public services than the higher levels of government. This rationale 
holds good in terms of gender development as local governments 
have better information on gender differentials regarding needs and 
preferences. Despite the growing recognition of fiscal 
decentralisation in gender development in the policy realm, in 
particular, attempts on fiscally decentralised gender budgeting; there 
have been relatively few empirical analyses on the topic.
1 This paper 
aims to take on this rare gamut of literature, focused on the nascent 
experiences on fiscal d ecentralisation and local level gender 
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responsive budgeting in India.  It is particularly relevant in the context 
that  India is the first country to institutionalise gender budgeting 
within  Ministry of Finance, adhering to the budgetary accounting 
framework, and analyse the possibilities of changes in the budgetary 
classification to integrate gender budgeting in the mainstream 
budgets.  
 
In India, with the 73
rd and 74
th Constitutional Amendments in 
1992, the third tier of government comprising the  Panchayati Raj 
Institutions PRIs and urban local bodies are given constitutional 
recognition as  local self governments. While creating an enabling 
environment for the devolution of finance and functions to the third 
tier and reserving one third of the members of the local bodies for 
women, initiative for decentralised gender responsive public policy 
initiative has been gaining momentum in India.  
 
In India, the new found policy space of feminisation of local 
governance coupled with fiscal devolution to the third tier may 
provide an impetus to adopt  gender lens more effectively in 
formulating budgets; reasons are mainly twofold. Firstly, greater fiscal 
autonomy with effective participation of women in governance at 
lower levels can make variations in the public expenditure decisions 
corresponding more to the revealed preferences (‘voice’) of women. 
Secondly, it helps to identify spatial gender needs,  ex-ante to 
budgeting; which is a step ahead from homogeneous ‘one-size-fits-
all’ gender budgeting policies. This paper examines the local level 
gender budgeting experiences in India, confining to three states 
where fiscal decentralisation has been comparatively more effective, 
viz., Kerala, Karnataka, and West Bengal.  
 
Among the three states, Kerala is relatively better in terms 
of fiscal autonomy at the third tier. Theoretically the reversed 
sequence of fiscal decentralisation in Kerala—financial devolution 
preceded functional devolution—may reduce the issues related to 
unfunded mandates. It is also to be noted that among t he three 
states, within government initiative to integrate gender in the process 
of fiscal decentralisation has been manifested only in Kerala.
2 Before 
delving into local level experiences on gender budgeting in three 
states, an attempt to analyse the intergovernmental fiscal system in 
India through a gender lens is also undertaken in the paper, 
especially in a situation where local governments depend heavily on 
fiscal transfers. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
provides a briefing  to the existing policy initiatives on gender   5
budgeting in India, assessing the plausible windows for fiscally 
decentralised gender budgeting. Section 3 critically reviews the 
process of fiscal decentralisation through a gender lens at the 
aggregate level. Sections 4, 5 and 6 respectively take up locallevel 
gender budgeting experiences in the three States,  viz., Kerala, 
Karnataka and West Bengal. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
II. Initiatives on Gender Budgeting in India 
 
 
The idea of introducing gender budgeting in India gathered 
momentum with the study done  by Lahiri, Chakraborty and 
Bhattacharyya (2003) of National Institute of Public Finance and 
Policy (hereafter, referred as NIPFP study).
3 To provide the analytical 
framework for gender budgeting, NIPFP study constructed an 
econometric model to link spending on public education and health to 
the Gender Development Index (GDI), showing the positive effect of 
such spending on this indicator of gender inequality. This approach 
does not refute the widely explored link between economic growth 
and the (gender sensitive) human development, rather to emphasise 
that it does substantially through higher public expenditure, 
particularly through health care and education (Chakraborty, 2005b).  
 
Given the limited scope of  trickledown effects of economic 
growth-promoting strategies, the role of fiscal policy stance in gender 
sensitive human development proceeds from market failures of one 
kind or another. Fiscal policy stance, is a key policy instrument to 
ensure human development and in particular gender development, 
which rest on the fact that the functioning of the market cannot, by 
itself, activate the signaling, response and mobility of economic 
agents to achieve efficiency in both static (allocative efficiency) and 
dynamic  (shift in the production frontier) terms.  This is all the more 
relevant at the subnational levels of fiscal policy stance, where as the 
provisioning of merit goods like education and health are vested with.  
The rubric of gender budgeting owes its roots to these analytics. 
 
What manifests gender budgeting in India? It is important to 
recall in this context that gender budgeting is a step ahead from 
Women’s Component Plan, the strategy adopted by the  National 
Development Council, one of the highest policy making bodies in the 
country, for achieving the specific objective of the Ninth Five Year 
Plan (1997-2002) the empowerment of women. “ Women’s 
Component Plan” (WCP) is confined to only the plan expenditure of   6
the Government and is thus partial. However, WCP is designed to 
ensure that not less than 30 percent of funds and benefits flow to 
women from the developmental sectors.  
 
Accepting that earmarking money for women through WCP is 
only a  second best principle of gender budgeting, NIPFP study has 
attempted an analysis of whole budgetary process through a gender 
lens.
4  WCP would have been more effective, had there been a 
differential targeting of expenditure emanating from the identification 
of appropriate programmes for women in various sectors. In other 
words, reprioritising the expenditure based on a generic list of 
appropriate programmes and policies for women might be more 
effective rather than adhoc targeting of 30 percent across sectors.  
 
The major debate in India on gender budgeting in the initial 
phase went much beyond the mechanics of adopting homogenous 
30 percent WCP to the very rationale of conducting gender budgeting 
itself. The gender diagnosis analysis carried out by NIPFP justified 
the need for conducting gender budgeting based on the empirical 
evidence that as  women and men are at the asymmetric levels of 
socio-economic development in India, the existing gender neutrality 
of budgets can lead to many unintentional negative consequences, 
translating the gender neutrality of budgets into gender b lindness. 
The study provides some selected indicators of the status of women 
in India, showing the degree of disadvantage especially in health, 
education and work participation. The study also evaluated the 
existing degree of gender inequality in India, presenting an 
interesting application of HDI, GDI and GEM
5 (Stotsky, 2006).  
 
The NIPFP study also expostulated that integrating gender 
perspective into budgetary policy has dual dimensions of equality and 
efficiency. From the efficiency  consideration, what is important is the 
social rate of return of investment in women, and in cases, this can 
be greater than the corresponding rate for men. The study 
highlighted that  gender inequality is inefficient  and costly to 
development.
6 Through these discussions, NIPFP study was rooting 
its rationale for gender budgeting in  externalities, a notion which 
encompasses equity as well as efficiency considerations. Gender 
budgeting intrinsically recognises these dual dimensions; and 
assumes that fiscal policy stance can be u sed to internalise the 
externalities through various policy instruments including taxation, 
subsidies and public expenditure. 
While discussing the externalities through a gender lens, an 
important point needs to be highlighted is the labour force exogeneity 
in the treatment of the care economy in the prevalent macroeconomic   7
policymaking, which is dubious. The intra-household gender 
asymmetries in the intensity and allocation of time and the choices 
regarding labour force participation in  care economy  have a lways 
been invisible in the macropolicies. Recognising that the dynamic 
interaction between the dual sets of economic activity  – that is, the 
statistically invisible  care economy  and that of market economy  – 
which marks the microfoundations of engendering  macroeconomic 
policies, the NIPFP study applies global substitution criteria of price 
variables to the time use budgets to value the care economy across 
selected states in India [within the framework of extended production 
boundary of Systems of National Accounts (SNA) 1993] and in turn 
integrate in the macropolicies. Realising that the allocation and 
efficiency of time we spent in care economy  might be more important 
to economic welfare than market economy through its positive 
externalities, the study has recommended to integrate the inferences 
from time-use budgets in gender budgeting. The point to be noted 
here is that the gender budgeting policies related to care economy 
would be more effective at the decentralised levels of government 
through social multiplier effects. 
 
The methodology adopted by NIPFP for gender budgeting 
received wide attention due to its simplicity and practicability in 
conducting gender budgeting  within the country and  between 
countries.
7  Stotsky (2006) noted that it represents an interesting 
effort at focusing on the gender-differentiated effects of budgetary 
spending and although the linkages of such spending to gender 
disparity measures and economic growth and welfare are only 
treated in brief, it provides a framework for such analyses to support 
sensible budget making. Within the analytical framework of gender 
budgeting, a few matrices have been developed by NIPFP to 
categorise the financial inputs from gender perspective. These 
analytical matrices for categorising public expenditure through a 
gender lens were as follows:  (i) specifically targeted expenditure to 
women and girls, (ii) pro-women allocations; which are the composite 
expenditure schemes with a significant women’s component  (that is, 
a scale of 30 <= E < 100; at least 30 percent targeted for women) 
and (iii) residual public expenditures that have gender-differential 
impacts (that is, a scale 0 <= E < 30). These three analytical matrices 
neatly fit into the existing programme budgeting framework in India. 
These matrices hold good even with the transition of existing 
accounting system to International Monetary Fund’s  Government 
Finance Statistics, where government budgets are broken down into 
functional and economic categorisations. This is possible through 
organising the budgetary data either by examining gender-
disaggregated public expenditure, Benefit Incidence Analysis (BIA),   8
or by segregation of gender specific allocations in the budget and 
accounts by introducing a new budget head of account for distinctly 
identifying the gender allocations at submajor head level in the 
budget documents for the second and third categories of public 
expenditure. Gender-disaggregated public expenditure BIA involves 
the measurement of unit cost of providing a particular service and the 
number of  units utilised by gender. The paucity of gender-
disaggregated data on services utilised constrains such benefit 
incidence analysis for a variety of public services.  Furthermore, 
theoretically, all public goods and services cannot be gender-
partitioned.  
 
Critiquing NIPFP methodology of categorising public 
expenditure, Banerjee (2003) proposed yet another way of classifying 
expenditure;  viz., (i)  relief policies, targeted to specific groups of 
women in distress (e.g. widows); (ii) gender-reinforcing assistance, 
which provides for women’s ‘needs in accepted gender roles’ (e.g. 
programmes  that address women’s reproductive functions); (iii) 
equality-promoting schemes, ‘which are meant specifically to remove 
some gender-based handicap of women’, including schemes such as 
crèches to allow women to work and extra toilets for girls in schools. 
Banerjee (2003) argued that this classification is helpful to categorise 
the short run and long run policy needs for women (that first two 
categories of programme help meet women’s immediate needs, but 
for long run, the third type of programme is essential). But the point to 
be noted here is that this classification does not fit into any formal 
budget accounting framework and hence it would be difficult to 
compare meaningfully different government budgets using this 
classification. Yet another limitation is that it confounds the 
reclassification of budget to a great extent due to the subjectivity 
involved in the treatment of what constitutes  gender-reinforcing 
assistance and gender  equality-promoting schemes in the budget.  
This classification therefore has not been used in India at the national 
and subnational levels for conducting gender budgeting.
8  
 
The policy series of ex-post gender budgeting analysis based 
on NIPF P methodology was revealing.
9 Higher budgetary allocation 
for women per se does not translate itself into higher spending, as 
there has been significant deviation between budget estimates and 
actuals. It is important to note in this context that gender sensitive 
analysis of budgets begins with categorising expenditure, but it does 
not  stop there. The NIPFP study recognises that the categorisation 
has to be followed by a number of exercises that examine what ‘use’ 
has been made of expenditures and what ‘impact’ this has had (that 
is, from the financial inputs to the gendered outputs and impacts).   9
Thus linking gender budgets to outcome budgets and performance 
budgeting are equally important.  Expenditure tracking surveys are 
also required to analyse the implementation aspects of these 
programmes and also to analyse the leakages in the financial 
allocation, if any.  
 
What budgetary reforms are therefore required for gender 
sensitive public policy? The policy solutions suggested by NIPFP 
study are mainly twofold.  First, to ensure transparency in the 
allocation for women through adequate changes in  budgetary 
classification to protect these provisions from reappropriation and 
thereby enhance accountability. Second, with the advent of fiscal 
decentralisation, strengthen the gender-sensitive budgeting at the 
sub-national government levels as provisioning of merit goods like, 
education and health, are primarily the responsibility of subnational 
governments.  
 
The first policy solution is addressed by the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), Government of India through the setting up of an 
expert group on " Classification of Government Transactions” in 
2004,
10 one of the TORs of which was institutionalising gender 
responsive budgeting process at the national level.  
 
Based on the recommendations of the Expert Group, gender 
budgeting has been institutionalised in India through the Ministry of 
Finance since 2005-06. Against the backdrop of the 
recommendations by the Expert Group, the Finance Minister has 
introduced a statement on Gender Budgeting in Union Budget 2005-
06, covering 10 demands for grants highlighting the gender 
sensitivities of budgetary allocations.
11 In one year’s time, the 
Finance Minister has been able to enlarge the statement to include 
24 demands for grants with an outlay of Rs.28, 737 crore.  Prima 
facie, Rs 28,737 crore appears as an Unpleasant Gender Arithmetic, 
as it constitutes only 5 percent of the total budget. But this aggregate 
figure reveals only a partial picture and the critical appraisal of this 
maiden attempt is beyond the scope of this paper.
12 
 
The second policy solution of strengthening gender 
budgeting at the decentralised levels threw mixed results. The NIPFP 
methodology for gender budgeting has been accepted by the 
Government of India to carry over this exercise to state-level. DWCD 
has co-ordinated these studies through NIPCCD and the analyses of 
these studies have been included as a separate chapter in the 
Annual Report of DWCD, since 2001.  In addition to these exercises, 
several states announced introduction of gender budgeting in their   10 
state budgets; which include Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. At the 
local level, only the Government of Kerala has taken the initiative to 
integrate gender budgeting, which will be taken up in this paper. 
Though  within government initiatives are absent, the paper also 
analyses the existing civil society initiatives of local level gender 
budgeting in Karnataka and West Bengal. The local-level 
experiences of gender budgeting in these three states will be dealt 
with, after an overall discussion of intergovernmental fiscal system in 








India is the largest democratic federal polity in the world. Out 
of over a quarter million local governments, only around 3000 are in 
the urban areas. Structurally, decentralisation in India would seem to 
have been carried to the smallest unit of habitation  viz. villages; but 
their resources and functions are limited. While substantial resources 
are raised or are devolved further to the second level, viz. the states, 
the third tier suffer acutely from inadequacy of resources. 
 
3.1  Asymmetry in Revenue and Expenditure Assignment 
 
Although the constitutional amendments provide an 
illustrative list of functions that are considered appropriate for local 
governments, they remain largely unfunded mandates. The 
amendments also made it mandatory to appoint State Finance 
Commission once in every five years to make recommendations 
regarding the fiscal transfers from the state to the local bodies. But 
progress in terms of functions and finance to local bodies has been 
tardy. 
 
The degree of decentralisation in any country is difficult to 
quantify. Fiscal decentralisation can broadly be captured by the share 
of sub-national expenditure in total expenditure and local government 
expenditure as percentage of GDP of the country. However, these 
indices do not capture the governance structure to understand the 
degree of power in terms of decision-making vested  at the local 
government over expenditure functions.
13 Lack of data on these 
components of governance structure limits the empirical analysis to a   11 
great extent. However, to capture a broad picture, a few proxies of 
fiscal decentralisation are given in table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: Fiscal Decentralisation in India 
 






(% of GDP)       
Centre  11.46  6.80  12.00 
States  7.80  10.90  13.60 
Local Bodies  0.54  2.10  2.20 
Urban Local Bodies  0.50  0.80  0.80 
Rural Local Bodies  0.04  1.40  1.40 
District Panchayats  Negligible  0.60  0.60 
Taluk Panchayats  Negligible  0.30  0.40 
Village Panchayats  0.04  0.40  0.40 
Total  19.80  19.80  27.80 
(% of total)       
Centre  57.88  34.43  43.20 
States  39.39  55.03  48.90 
Local Bodies  2.73  10.53  7.90 
Urban Local Bodies  2.53  4.07  2.90 
Rural Local Bodies  0.20  6.46  5.00 
District Panchayats  Negligible  3.21  2.20 
Taluk Panchayats  Negligible  1.44  1.40 
Village Panchayats  0.20  1.82  1.40 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Source: Rao and Singh (2005) 
 
The local government expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
constituted 2.20 percent, while in terms of revenue mobilisation, local 
government revenue constituted 0.54 percent of GDP. Specifically, 
over a quarter million rural local bodies in India mobilise only 0.04 
percent  of GDP. The expenditure of  local government  constituted 
7.90 percent of total, but their revenues accounted for only 2.73 
percent of the total.  
 
The fiscal autonomy ratio of local government (the ratio of 
own revenue to total expenditure) was as low as 27 percent in India. 
In the case of low income states, it was even lower at 13.03 percent 
(Rao et al, 2004).
14 As can be seen from table 2, the share of own tax 
and own non-tax revenue sources of  Panchayati Raj Institutions 
(PRIs) in aggregate government resources is negligible.
15  
   12 
Table 2: Composition of Revenue of PRIs in India (%): 2002-03 
 
  Kerala  Karnataka  West Bengal  All India 
Own tax  12.82  1.38  5.57  3.87 
Own non tax  10.70  -  12.07  2.98 
Own revenue  23.53  1.38  17.64  6.84 
Assignment+Devolution  15.87  98.62  0.00  27.69 
Grants-in-aid  57.48  -  82.36  58.95 
Others  3.12  -  0.00  6.52 
Total other revenue   76.47  98.62  82.36  93.16 
Total revenue  100  100  100  100 
Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report (2004) 
 
Given that a major part of the subnational government 
revenue accrues from fiscal transfers,  the attempt of gender 
budgeting at local level in India does not go far enough, unless the 
institutional mechanisms of fiscal decentralisation and degree of 
fiscal autonomy are varied.  There is a lack of transparency  and 
accountability in the system because of extensive use of inadequate 
revenue assignments, lack of sufficient decentralisation to local 
bodies, and a poorly designed intergovernmental transfer system.
16 
However, as local governments depend heavily on transfers from the 
higher level of government, could engendering the criteria of fiscal 
devolution be a plausible policy step? 
 
3.2. Criteria of Fiscal Devolution through a Gender Lens 
 
In the multi-tier structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations in India, 
the Central Finance Commission which is appointed every five years 
by the President of India to mediate revenue transfer from the centre 
to the states also makes recommendations with regard to the 
financial devolution to the local bodies as a measure to “augment the 
Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement the resources of the 
panchayats and municipalities’.  A total grant of Rs. 20,000 crore for 
the PRIs and Rs. 5000 crore for the municipalities has been 
recommended by Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC)  for the period 
2005-10 to be distributed to the states. The shares of each state (in 
percentage) in the allocation for local bodies, urban and rural, which 
are given in table 3, are determined on the basis of a set of criteria.  
This criteria of fiscal devolution includes population, geographical 
area, distance from highest per capita income, index of deprivation 
and revenue effort (table 4). Apart from the transfers ordained by the 
Central Finance Commission for local bodies, as mentioned earlier, 
each state is required to appoint State Finance Commission (SFC)   13 
every five years to make recommendations on the transfers to be 
made to local bodies from the state’s coffers. Table 4 also reports the 
criteria of fiscal devolution suggested by the first SFCs of Karnataka, 
Kerala, and West Bengal.  
  
Table 3: Shares of States in Allocation (2005-2010) 
 
S.N  State  Panchayats  Municipalities 
1  Andhra Pradesh  7.935  7.480 
2  Arunachal Pradesh   0.340  0.060 
3  Assam  2.630  1.100 
4  Bihar  8.120  2.840 
5  Chhatisgarh   3.075  1.760 
6  Goa  0.090  0.240 
7  Gujarat  4.655  8.280 
8  Haryana  1.940  1.820 
9  Himachal Pradesh   0.735  0.160 
10  Jammu and Kashmir  1.405  0.760 
11  Jharkhand  2.410  1.960 
12  Karnataka  4.440  6.460 
13  Kerala  4.925  2.980 
14  Madhya Pradesh  8.315  7.220 
15  Maharashtra  9.915  15.820 
16  Manipur  0.230  0.180 
17  Meghalaya  0.250  0.160 
18  Mizoram  0.100  0.200 
19  Nagaland  0.200  0.120 
20  Orissa   4.015  2.080 
21  Punjab  1.620  3.420 
22  Rajasthan  6.150  4.400 
23  Sikkim  0.065  0.020 
24  Tamil Nadu  4.350  11.440 
25  Tripura   0.285  0.160 
26  Uttar Pradesh  14.640  10.340 
27  Uttaranchal  0.810  0.680 
28  West Bengal  6.355  7.860 
  Total  100 (20,000 crore)  100 (5000 crore) 





Table 4: Criteria for Financial Devolution to Local Bodies 
Criteria  India 
(TFC) 
Kerala   Karnataka  West 
Bengal 
Population   40  75  33.33  50   14 
Geographical area  10    33.33  10 
Distance from highest per  
capita income 
20       
Index of deprivation 
1  10       
Population of backward 
Population or SC/ST 
   
5 
   
10 
Rural population         10 
Illiteracy rate      11.11  10 
Persons per head in 
Government hospitals 
     
11.11 
 
Road length/sq. km      11.11   
Inverse ratio of per capita 
bank deposit 
       
10 
Revenue effort, of which 
(a)  With respect to own 
       revenue of states 




     
Tax effort    5     
Financial need    15     
Total Weight  100  100  100  100 
Note: 
1 The index of deprivation (DI) has been designed as, 
DI = 0.5 X + 0.25 (Y+Z), where 
X= percentage of households fetching water from a distance 
Y= percentage of households without latrines 
Z= percentage of households without drainage 
Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report (2004) and First SFC Reports of Kerala, 
Karnataka and West Bengal. 
 
Among the criteria of fiscal devolution to the third tier, 
population turns out to b e the predominant one. It is true that 
population criteria has an advantage of providing summary measure 
of the basic needs free from value judgement and arbitrariness, 
unlike other indicators. But heavy reliance on too broad a measure of 
need like population could be inconsistent with promoting fiscal 
equalisation or balanced development of regions within a state. 
Gulati (1987) pointed out that population as a basis of distribution 
ignores altogether the existence of income disparities among the 
states. As an alternative to that, he argued that distribution of 
resources on the basis of per capita income would be much more 
even and fiscally equalising.
17 Significantly higher weightage to 
population by all the SFCs, instead of per capita income may 
increase the inter-panchayat disparities. Secondly, devolution on the 
basis of population may be regressive in the sense that it does not 
necessarily have the desired redistributive effects, since some 
relatively developed local bodies could be more populous. Karnataka 
justifies relatively lower weightage to population on the grounds that 
in a situation of declining decadal growth of population in several   15 
districts, higher weightage to it may reduce their share of plan funds. 
Instead of giving too much weightage to population, they have given 
equal weight to population and area, as large areas impose 
additional expenditure for providing the same level of public services.  
 
Population criteria apart, all three SFCs have considered 
applying other indices of socio-economic backwardness for the 
horizontal distribution of resources. While selecting the criterion of 
backwardness, one has to be very careful so that it does not suffer 
from arbitrariness and excessive value judgement. The index of 
backwardness should reflect more expenditure need of a backward 
panchayat than that of a relatively developed panchayat. The indices 
used by three states, such as, the share of SC/ST population, 
illiteracy etc can certainly be considered to reflect the need for funds 
for social and economic upliftment but not necessarily of expenditure 
priorities of the local body, unless these priorities are built into 
financial allocation.  
 
Yet another question arises is whether objective indicators of 
economic and social infrastructure could also be used for assessing 
the backwardness of a local body. TFC has incorporated indices of 
deprivation including percentage of households fetching water from a 
distance and percentage of households without sanitation. Public 
investment in infrastructure like wat er supply and sanitation can have 
positive social externalities in terms of educating the girl child and 
improving the health and nutritional aspects of the household. A 
World Bank study noted that easy accessibility to drinking water 
facilities might lead to an increase in school enrolment particularly 
girls; in Madagascar, 83 percent of the girls who did not go to school 
spent their time collecting water, while only 58 percent of the girls 
who attended school spent time collecting water.
18  However, the 
major criticism against the use of social indicators as an index of 
backwardness is that it will be biased against the regions, which 
despite poor resource base, have achieved relatively high levels of 
attainment in these sectors.  
 
Does fiscal equalisation t ransfers enhance gender equity? 
Though these transfers are not specifically targeted to the poor, the 
poor will benefit from the general capacity increase in the region, 
especially women.  When unconditional transfers are made, 
equalisation transfers aim to neutralise deficiency in fiscal capacity 
but not that in revenue effort. Sometimes adjustments affecting cost 
and need factors may also be accommodated. In many ways, the 
Finance Commission formula-based fiscal transfers is not part of an 
equalisation grant system, but rather part of general or unconditional   16 
funding, which might have equalisation grant features. Chakraborty, 
P. (2003) seeks to empirically investigate if the fiscal transfers in 
India follow the principles of fiscal equalisation. Econometric 
investigation using a panel data for 15 major states for the years 
1990-91 to 1999-00 in a  fixed effects model revealed a strikingly 
regressive element of transfers, with aggregate tax transfers per 
capita positively related to state per capita income. However, grants 
transfers negated this trend, showing clear progressivity though not 
sufficient to eliminate horizontal inequalities owing to smaller 
proportion of grants in the overall transfer in comparison to tax 
transfers. His results echo those of previ ous studies, reinforcing the 
oft-made observation that richer states are receiving more per capita 
fiscal transfers than poorer states.  
 
Fiscal equalisation grants can correct for spatial inequalities 
in the provisioning of merit goods or quasi-public goods, which has 
evident gender differential impacts. Considering the acute spatial 
disparities in service standards in the provision of health and 
education, the TFC has tried to bring in the equalisation principle for 
certain specific grants for education and health on the expenditure 
side. Although equalisation should be pursued mostly, if not 
exclusively, by the equalisation grant system in order to free up other 
grant instruments to pursue other objectives, this is a temporary 
positive move given the present need for more equalisation in the 
system (Eunice Heredia-Ortíz and Mark Rider, 2006). It is also noted 
that after gaining experience in implementing these grants, larger 
grants and a more comprehensive approach can be developed for 
meeting the needs fully, which also requires supplementation by plan 
grants (Srivastava, 2006).  Fiscal equalisation grants for health and 
education can redress the capability deprivation across gender.  
 
The moot question at this juncture is whether gender criteria 
needs be incorporated in the unconditional fiscal transfers. One of 
the arguments against incorporating gender concerns in 
unconditional fiscal transfers is that these transfers are meant for 
offsetting the fiscal disabilities and it is desirable to keep the transfer 
system formula simple and without perverse incentives (Rao, 2006). 
However, in India, given the disturbing demographic facts of the 
precipitous decline in the sex ratio for children in 0 -6 age group 
especially in some of the prosperous states of India
19, there can be 
no valid objection to using central transfers for this purpose. A simple 
method for this could be to introduce some weight for female 
population of the states in the tax devolution formula of the Finance 
Commission and the Gadgil formula for  allocation of central 
assistance for state plans (Bagchi and Chakraborty, 2004). The   17 
message would be even stronger and more appropriate if the 
population of girl children only, that is the number of females in the 0-
6 age group, is adopted as the basis for determining the relative 
shares of the states in the amount carved out of the divisible pool by 
applying the allotted weight.
20 A special dispensation for girls would 
also be justifiable in a scheme of need-based equalisation transfers.   
 
While social mores cannot be changed by fiscal fiats, 
especially when prejudices run deep, state action is called for, when 
they are blatantly oppressive to any section of the community. Indeed 
such action is an imperative. The transfer system can and should 
play a role in upholding the right to life for the females of the country 
(Bagchi and Chakraborty, 2004). Having said that, it needs to be 
mentioned that it is not plausible to incorporate more gender 
variables in the formula and complicate the transfer-formula of central 
as well as State Finance Commissions.
21 In other words, inclusion of 
a gender inequality index in the transfer formula may not result in the 
intended results as the variables included in the index may neutralise 
each other.  
 
To summarise, amidst the p lethora of criteria for fiscal 
devolution, the right thing to do—even from the gender perspective—
appears to be to first make fiscal transfers based on per capita basis, 
which would be much more even and fiscally equalising; and then 
make suitable adjustme nts for backwardness.
22  It goes without 
saying that weightage to genuine backwardness in addition to 
population is more redistributive than weightage to population alone. 
Given the magnitude of missing women in India and the disturbing 
practices of gender  discrimination that exist  even before birth, a 
penalty criterion needs to be incorporated in the unconditional fiscal 
transfers for not rewarding the states with adverse juvenile sex ratio.  
 
Having discussed the fiscal decentralisation process in India 
through a gender lens at the aggregate level, the following sections 
critically review the local level gender budgeting experiences of three 
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In the backdrop of democratic decentralisation, Kerala has 
been a pioneer state in India in moving towards gender responsive 
planning and budgeting at local level. The simultaneous occurrence 
of feminization of political governance at the third tier with 33 percent 
representation of women created new democratic space for local 
level interventions by an agency of Women Elected Representatives 
(Isaac, 2004). Despite the remarkable achievements in terms of 
gender indicators in health and education, Kerala however has been 
experiencing extreme marginalisation of women especially in t he 
spheres of governance and work force participation. In other words, 
superior conditions of women in Kerala in terms of social indicators 
has had no impact on  gender status.  It was in this context that a 
deliberate attempt was made to incorporate the gender perspective 
into the process of democratic decentralisation.  
 
4.1 Democratic Decentralisation: The Process 
 
Though it was only in 1991 that Kerala (like the rest of India) 
came to have elected bodies at the district level, the civil conditions 
of the state have been ideal for democratic decentralisation reforms, 
since long. Widespread literacy, sharply reduced deprivation and 
absolute poverty, good health performance, successfully carried out 
land reforms, powerful class and mass organisations etc. have acted 
in synergy for Kerala as an ideal state for introduction of participatory 
local democracy.  
 
Popularly known as the ‘ Kerala Model’ , the state has 
demonstrated how appropriate redistribution strategies can meet the 
basic needs for citizens despite low levels of economic development. 
However, Kerala has failed to translate high social sector 
achievements into comparable achievements in the material 
production sectors. This has resulted in economic stagnation of the 
state, growing unemployment and an acute fiscal crisis thereby 
raising questions about the sustainability of the “Kerala Model”.  
 
Democratic decentralisation, intended to accelerate 
economic growth and create a new model of growth with equity, has 
been the political response to the stagnating economy of the state.
23  
All 1,214 local governments in Kerala—municipalities and the three 
tiers of rural local government—-district, block and gram panchayats 
were given new functions and powers of decision-making, and were 
granted discretionary budgeting authority over 35-40 percent of the 
state’s developmental expenditures. The democratic decentralisation, 
however, attempted more than just devolution of resources and 
functions. Local governments were not only charged with designing   19 
and implementing their own development plans, they were mandated 
to do so through an elaborate series of participatory exercises in 
which citizens were given a direct role in shaping policies and 
projects (discussions from Isaac and Franke, 2000).  
 
4.2.  Reversed Sequence of Decentralisation 
 
In Kerala, the usual sequence of decentralisation has been 
reversed; financial devolution preceded functional devolution. In 
1996, 35–40 percent of the outlay of Ninth Five Year Plan was 
devolved to local self-government institutions. This financial 
devolution took place outside the purview of the State Finance 
Commission of Kerala. Given the low level of administrative capacity 
at the newly created third tier and the lack of experience of newly 
elected members of local bodies, the reversal of sequence of 
decentralisation tended to create disequilibrium during plan 
implementation. However complementary reforms undertaken by the 
state government have created conditions for successful devolution. 
For instance, quite contrary to the rest of India where financial 
devolution took the form of schemes (tied in nature), in Kerala 75-80 
percent of devolution has been in the form of untied grants-in-aid. 
Thus the nature of financial devolution in Kerala encourages 
maximum fiscal autonomy to the local governments.
24    
 
4.3. New Democratic Space for Gender  
 
Kerala reveals a paradox in terms of gender development. A 
much lower gender gap in social indicators and high female 
empowerment have accompanied Kerala’s remarkable performance 
in human development  as demonstrated by several attempts to 
constructing the GDI and the GEM at the regional level for India.
25 
However, high rates of literacy and the dramatic decline in fertility did 
not translate into rapid growth of paid employment for women nor into 
upward occupational mobility. One of the reasons for this 
phenomenon is the sex-differentiated pattern of education.
26 The 
electoral arena of Kerala has also been short of women’s 
representation. While in the state assembly the numbers elected 
have varied between 5 and 8 members in a house of 140 legislators 
since the early nineties, the proportion of women candidates hovered 
around 5 percent for the last two and a half decades.  
 
The process of democratic decentralisation is expected to 
enhance the visibility of educated women in the public sphere with 33 
percent representation for women at local level. Table 5 shows the 
distribution of elected representatives disaggregated by gender and   20 
class in local bodies in Kerala. The total number of elected 
representatives was 14,173 of whom 75 percent belonged to the 
gram panchayats, that is, around 10.8 per gram panchayats.  
 
Table 5: Distribution (%) of Elected Representatives of  
Local Bodies in Kerala, 1997 
 





Male  Female  Total  SC  ST 








96    
(0.9) 






147   
(9.5) 
11    
(0.7) 




300   
(100) 
18     
(6.0) 
3      
(0.1) 






78      
(4.8) 
3      
(0.0) 










 Source: (Basic Data), State Election Commission, 1997 cited in Isaac and Frank 
(2000) 
 
The analysis of characteristics of the women elected 
representatives revealed that only 10 percent of them had prior 
experience as elected representatives and only 18 percent had 
education above matriculation (table 6). It is also revealed that while 
elected women representatives are better educated than their male 
counterparts (a social fact that is unique to Kerala in the Indian 
context), the women were on average younger, much less politically 
experienced, and inadequately equipped with basic knowledge of 
rules, regulations, and administrative issues. Moreover, women 
representatives have had to bear a triple burden of public office, 










Table 6: Selected Characteristics of Elected Representatives of 
Local Bodies in Kerala 
 
Characteristics  Male  Female  Average   21 
(%)  (%)  (%) 
With previous experience in 
Holding office 
27  10  21 
Age below 30  14.30  26.25  18.83 
Age above 50  20.95  11.12  17.33 
Employed in the primary Sector  33.68  12.65  25.72 
Employed in service sector  17.99  21.30  19.25 
Unemployed  9.99  33.37  18.85 
Retired  6.23  6.06  6.17 
Education below high school  20.27  11.92  17.11 
High school education  48.56  52.65  50.11 
With graduate or post 
graduate degree 
15.31  18.05  16.35 
   Source:  Isaac and Frank (2000) 
 
As part of the democratic decentralisation, women elected 
representatives were given continuous capacity-building training 
programmes, which have helped them significantly to adapt to new 
challenges. A self -assessment survey  of women elected 
representatives shows that their administrative knowledge and 
management skills, as well as their ability to officiate at public 
functions and interact effectively with their constituencies, have 
improved very significantly over the years (Isaac et. al., 1999). 
 
There were two avenues through which democratic 
decentralisation thus contributed to empowerment of women;           
(i) agency of women elected representatives (WER); and (ii) new 
democratic space for local level intervention by women. On the one-
hand Kerala features extreme cases of marginalisation of women 
despite remarkable development achievements, and on the other the 
state has introduced one of the most radical programmes on 
democratic decentralisation, which makes Kerala an ideal case for 
studying the impact of fiscal decentralisation on gender (Isaac, 2004).  
 
4.4. Identifying Spatial Gender Needs for Budgeting 
 
Yet another remarkable feature of democratic 
decentralisation in Kerala was the noble attempt to incorporate the 
gender budgeting in the process through providing a Women’s 
Component Plan (WCP) by earmarking 10 percent of State’s Plan 
Outlay towards specifically targeted programmes for women. These 
programmes are determined by women at the local level through 
participatory process at gram sabhas ( ward-level assemblies). The 
networks of neighborhood groups and self-help groups were linked to 
gram sabhas to increase participation of women. With the   22 
constitutional provision for one-third reserved representation of 
women in Local Self Governments and the introduction of a special 
WCP amounting to 10 percent of the plan outlay, what has been the 
experience so far? 
 
The distinctive feature of the democratic decentralisation in 
Kerala is the  planning function of the local self  governments to 
identify the spatial gender needs, prelude to budgeting.  In other 
words, as a statutory precondition for receiving the WCP from the 
state government, local governments must prepare a comprehensive 
area plan. This planning process includes holding gram sabhas, and 
convening sectoral task forces in which non-official experts and 
volunteers directly prepare reports, formulate projects, and draft 
sectoral plans. The various stages of plan preparation in effect 
represent new participatory spaces in which women, elected women 
representatives and officials deliberate and prioritise developmental 
goals and projects. In order to ensure transparency and participation 
without compromising the technical requirements of planning, the 
planning process is d ivided into discrete phases with distinct 
objectives, key activities, and associated training programmes (Isaac 
and Heller, 2002). Though modifications to the sequence have been 
made every year, the basic model for incorporating the gender 
component in various stages of democratic decentralisation in Kerala 
remains the same to design the WCP (table 7). 
 
Table 7: Gender Components of Democratic Decentralisation  
in Kerala 
 
Phase  Objective  Activities  Gender Component 
I (Gram sabhas)
27  Identify the felt 
needs of the 
people. 
Gram sabhas in rural 
areas and ward 
conventions in urban 
areas. 
Special subject group 
in the gram sabhas to 
discuss gender 
problems. 
II (Development   














Special chapter in 
development report on 
gender issues.  
Special subject group 
for discussing gender 




Table 7: Gender Components of Democratic Decentralisation  
in Kerala (contd.) 
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Phase  Objective  Activities  Gender Component 
III (Task forces)  Preparation of 
projects. 
Meetings of task 
forces. 
A special task force for 
women development 
projects.  Gender 
impact statement of 
projects. 
IV (Elected bodies)  Formulation of 
plans of grassroot 
tiers 
Plan formulation 
meetings of elected 
representatives 
A separate chapter on 
women development 
projects. 10% to be set 
apart for women 
component plan 
V (Elected bodies)  Formulation of 
plans of higher 
tiers 
Plan formulation 
meetings of elected 
representatives 
A separate chapter on 
women development 
projects. 10% of plan 
outlay of the State  to 





approval of plans 
Meetings of expert 
committees. 
 
Source: Isaac and Frank (2000) 
 
The major failure with regard to this experiment of 
incorporating gender budgeting in the democratic decentralisation 
process was that the WCP for the first year did not meet targets, both 
in terms of overall allocation and the relevance of projects.
28 The 
allocation for the WCP fell far short (4.26%) of the suggested 
minimum of 10 percent in the annual plans for 1997-98. The share 
steadily declined as one moved up the t ier (i.e. from GP to block 
panchayat and then to district p anchayat). The proportion of Plan 
grant-in-aid was also low in WCP projects.  
 
Besides, there was not much difference in overall projects 
and WCP projects. The proportion of WCP that could be genuinely 
described as women development projects was also debatable. A 
few of these shortcomings were dealt with in the second annual year 
plan through a series of policy initiatives.  First, more than the 
statutory minimum requirement of 10 percent of the plan grant-in-aid 
was earmarked for WCP in all districts. Second, an undue emphasis 
on credit and beneficiary contribution in women development projects 
was reduced and more realistic patterns of project financing were 
adopted during the second year. Third, the quality of projects 
improved. The tendency to include the general sector projects in 
WCP on the basis of notional (indirect) benefits to women has 
declined and the number of projects that specifically address the 
gender status of women has significantly increased (Isaac and Heller, 
2002). 
   24 
It is also to be noted that changes were made in the role and 
functions of the WCP task forces. Clear guidelines were established 
to design WCP projects, moving away from WCP investing in 
economic infrastructure including roads, water and sanitation to more 
microfinance programmes and small-scale industries (appendix 1). 
As a result of these measures, many weaknesses were rectified.
29 
Despite the initial disequilibrium with regard to gender budgeting at 
local level in the year of commencement, the spurious projects on 
gender disappeared in due course and ‘practical gender needs’ 
projects became the building block for institutionalising ‘strategic 
gender needs’.
30   
 
The experience of WCP projects in Kerala of moving away 
from economic infrastructure to microfinance programmes generates 
a d ebate on ‘specifically targeted programmes for poor’ versus 
‘infrastructure programmes’; particularly in terms of gender 
budgeting. An IFPRI study  showed that public expenditure on road 
infrastructure has the largest impact on poverty reduction.
31 In this 
context, it is to be noted that investment in infrastructure can catalyse 
the fulfillment of  practical needs of women; however gender 
budgeting is required more for addressing the financial allocation and 
implementation issues related to the  strategic needs of women. 
Microfinance sector, one of the areas which was given emphasis in 
WCP projects in Kerala through credit-linked self help groups (SHGs) 
in the later years, can ensure the strategic needs of women.  
 
Unlike in the Philippines, earmarking a definite proportion of 
budget for women has not led to marginalisation of gender issues in 
the mainstream budgeting, as floor limits have not been taken as 
ceiling in case of Kerala. Rather, identifying the spatial gender needs 
ex-ante to budgeting led to allocation of  more than the statutory 
minimum requirement of 10 percent of the plan grant-in-aid 
earmarked for WCP in all districts.   Though WCP is considered as 
second best principle of gender budgeting, Kerala’s experience of 
linking WCP ex-ante to identifying local needs through the 
appropriate institutional mechanisms proves that it is tantamount to 
designing the gender budgeting based on differential targeting of 
expenditure emanating from the identification of appropriate 
programmes for women in various sectors or reprioritising the 
expenditure based on a generic list of appropriate programmes and 
policies for women. Therefore Kerala experience of WCP is more 
effective than ad hoc uniform targeting as in case of the Philippines 
GAD budget as well as the national level WCP designed as part of 
the Ninth-Five-Year-Plan in India. 





The standardised system of decentralisation came to 
existence in Karnataka only after the 73
rd Constitutional Amendment 
(1992) through the  Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act (1993).
32  It 
provided for a three-tier structure of rural local government with 27 
zilla parishads, 175  block panchayats and 5659 gram panchayats. 
Although the process of decentralisation has been effective and 
created wide possibilities for integrating gender needs at local level in 
Karnataka, the scope has remained largely unexplored. Unlike 
Kerala, there has been no  within government  initiative to conduct 
gender budgeting at the third tier in Karnataka. However, there has 
been a civil society initiative on ‘ Building Budgets from Below” to 
examine whether the increased  feminisation of governance [in 
Karnataka, 44 percent of those elected to village  panchayats are 
women, though the constitution provides for 33 percent] could alter 
the public expenditure decisions at the third tier in Karnataka.
33  
 
The first phase of the study revealed that devolved functions 
have remained largely as  unfunded mandates  and the elected 
women representatives (EWR)  were not capable to explore their 
newfound powers in altering the budgetary priorities towards their 
needs. An attempt to rectify this lacuna was taken up in the second 
phase of the study through a technique of  Janaagraha (community 
participation). An exclusive training was given to the EWRs as part of 
Janaagraha with regard to budgeting. It was revealed in the third 
phase of the study that EWRs were empowered to identify the spatial 
gender needs and arrive at the financial requirements, but their 
bargaining power in terms of altering the budgetary priorities remain 
dismal.  
 
The study found that EWR are frequently excluded from 
budget discussions, and the requests they made for funding of 
projects in their constituencies were given less priority than those 
made by men elected representatives. The study concluded that this 
happen because of gender discrimination and gender bias shown by 
the authorities while allocating works and distributing benefits. As a 
result, most women members could not undertake development 
works in their respective constituencies.  
The methodology adopted for this study, however, has 
certain limitations, due to non-inclusion of a simultaneous study of 
control groups to analyse the impact of  Janaagraha  and other   26 
training modules adopted in the second phase of the project. Also a 
longitudinal survey (at least two, a benchmark survey and an impact 
survey) would have been more beneficial to analyse the 
intertemporal effects of feminisation of governance in determining 
public expenditure for gender needs. However, it is to be cautioned 
that even control group methodology should not be infected with 
problems like sample selection bias and  Hawthorne effect (that is, 
any form of intervention may result in a short-term positive response 
from the treatment group).  
 
5.2. Planning and Budgetary Process at Local Level 
 
Are there any mechanisms in the local level planning and 
budgetary systems in Karnataka, which can provide scope to PRIs 
for catering to spatial gender priorities? It is often noted that although 
the planning process should ideally start at the gram panchayat level 
with participation from the gram sabha and the local people, it is 
usually the  gram panchayats themselves who identify and prioritise 
works to be undertaken. This severely limits the scope of integrating 
gender needs in the local level planning in Karnataka. 
 
Moreover, the resource envelope is drawn based on the 
resources the  panchayat expects to generate and the estimated 
transfers indicated by the state government.
34 Under the prevailing 
structure of decentralisation in Karnataka, most of the schemes along 
with the personnel are transferred to the  panchayats, though the 
financial allocation required to implement the schemes is often 
inadequate. This persistent dearth of funds  prevents the local body 
from initiating plans for suitable public service provision as well as 
prioritisation of existing schemes. As the panchayats receive funds 
from multiple sources (consolidated funds of the state as well as the 
central government, various regional development boards and other 
agencies) there seem to prevail lack of co-ordination and 
transparency in implementation of various schemes which can result 
in misappropriation and inefficiency.  
 
 
VI.  West Bengal 
 
 
The origin of fiscal decentralisation in West Bengal may be 
traced to the late 19
th century. However, the local bodies enjoyed 
very limited autonomy and were dominated by rural elites given the 
property restrictions on franchise. After independence, as per the 
recommendation of Balwantrai-Mehta Committee (1957),  West   27 
Bengal Panchayat Act was passed in the same year with the 
intention to set up a four-tier panchayati raj system.
35 Subsequently 
with the enactment of the West Bengal Panchayati Raj Act of 1993, a 
three-tier system of  panchayats was introduced at district, block and 
village levels. The organisation structure of the third tier system in 
West Bengal comprises 16 zilla parishads, 340 block panchayats and 
3314 gram panchayats. 
 
The State Finance Commission of West Bengal constituted 
aftermath to 73
rd Constitutional Amendment recommended the fiscal 
devolution to the three tiers of PRIs in the ratio of 30:20:50.  As 
mentioned, the fiscal devolution (16 percent of the net proceeds of 
the own tax revenue of the state government which go as entitlement 
to the PRIs) is based on two criteria; population and the index of 
backwardness, giving equal weight to both criteria. It is to be noted 
here is that in order to encourage own revenue initiatives of PRIs, 
SFC recommended that 2 percent of the entitlement due to a district 
would be set aside to operate as an incentive fund. The incentive 
scheme proposed was that any local body raising its own income by 
5 percent or more in a financial year should be entitled to a bonus of 
2/3 of the incremental revenue.  
 
The recommendation of SFC of West Bengal in terms of 
devolution has considerably reduced adhocism  and arbitrariness in 
the fiscal devolution to the third tier. It guarantees a non-discretionary 
assured grant for each PRI that could be spent according to the 
priorities set by themselves, even though the dependence of PRIs on 
grants would continue in West Bengal. Yet another notable 
development is that the SFC made it a point that any scheme of 
devolution of resources from the state level to local bodies should be 
from the pool of state’s own taxes instead of individual tax based 
sharing, since growth of individual taxes vary considerably from year 
to year.  
 
6.2.  Planning and Budgetary Process at Local Level 
 
With the commencement of SFC, there w ere significant 
changes in the planning process at the district level. Earlier, the 
District Plans consisted mostly of departmental schemes drawn up by 
the departments, may be with the participation of lower tier officials of 
the departments, but independently of the elected bodies. The role of 
the three-tier panchayats in the District Plan largely consisted of 
utilisation of funds provided to them for poverty alleviation 
programmes or as untied funds. The integration of planning at the 
district level was more of a formality before the SFC came. The new   28 
entitlement scheme recommended by SFC has provided the elected 
bodies with considerable funds to pursue their own priorities through 
the plans they can draw up. The flexibility of district plans thus 
increased considerably.  The question at this juncture is whether 
these changes occured in the planning and budgeting process 
provided any scope for the new EWR to prioritise their gender 
needs?  
 
A MIT study by Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2001) has 
measured the impact of feminisation of governance at local level on 
the outcomes of decentralisation with data collected from a survey of 
all investments in local public goods made by the village councils in 
one district in West Bengal. They found that women leaders of village 
councils invest more in infrastructure that is relevant to the needs of 
rural women, like drinking water, fuel and roads, and that village 
women are more likely to participate in the policymaking process if 
the leader of their village council is a woman. Thus placing women in 
leadership position in governance at the local level can change the 
expenditure decisions of the local bodies and in turn changes the 
types of public good investments at local level more corresponding to 
the revealed preferences (‘voice’) by women (Stern, 2002). 
 
The study however has confronted a few criticisms. Bardhan 
(2002) noted that without direct evidence on the nature of women’s 
preferences relative to men’s and since women’s reservation in the 
leadership positions in local government was not linked to the 
distribution of women in the village, this study does not quite address 
how local democracy affects the underrepresented groups in the 
village to implement their desired outcomes.  
 
Yet another study in the context of West Bengal on 
decentralised gender budgeting by UNIFEM, examining the 
budgetary policies with the broad objective of assessing the extent of 
efforts put in by the state government towards improving the relative 
position of women in the state, is mainly confined to state level.
36 
However, the analysis of local budgets under this UNIFEM study 
reveals that there is no information about whether or not funds given 
to local bodies are actually spent or not. It also makes a few 
reference to the fact that the local bodies are not capable of 
executing the functions devolved due to low technical capabilities of 
their staff. The study also shows that schemes are similarly loaded 
on the local bodies by all superior levels of government without any 
checks on the technical capability of the local bodies to execute the 
works. The result is that funds remain unspent and each PRI has a 
growing opening balance.





The paper examined the process of fiscal decentralisation 
and local level gender sensitive budgeting across three states in 
India, where decentralisation process has been relatively effective 
compared to other states. Before delving into local level experiences 
on gender budgeting in the three states, an attempt to analyse the 
intergovernmental fiscal system in India through a gender lens is also 
undertaken in the paper, especially in a situation where local 
governments depend heavily on fiscal transfers. T he paper argues 
that amidst the plethora of criteria for fiscal devolution, the right thing 
to do—even from the gender perspective—is to first make fiscal 
transfers based on per capita basis, which would be much more even 
and fiscally equalising; and then make suitable adjustments for 
backwardness.  Further, weightage to genuine indices of 
backwardness in fiscal transfers in addition to population is more 
redistributive than weightage to population alone. Given the 
magnitude of missing women in India and the disturbing practices of 
gender discrimination that exist even before birth, a penalty criterion 
needs to be incorporated in the unconditional fiscal transfers for not 
rewarding the states with adverse juvenile sex ratio.  However, the 
design for gender component in fiscal transfers is only a second best 
principle of gender budgeting. The first best is to integrate gender 
concerns in the overall budgetary process at the local level and 
ensure the transparency and accountability through better 
governance with effective participation of women in local bodies. 
Kerala has shown a good example in integrating both the elements 
through integrating gender needs in the process of decentralised 
planning after identifying the gender needs through participatory 
process through  gram sabhas as well as translating it into women 
component plan in fiscal transfers. In Karnataka, the process of 
decentralisation has created immense scope for incorporating gender 
needs at local level, though that remains substantially unexplored. In 
West Bengal, the women in governance at the third tier could change 
the types of public expenditure at local level more corresponding to 
the revealed preferences (‘voice’) by women. However, that could 
have little influence on gender needs as most of the expenditure 
even at the local level is in the nature of committed non-
developmental expenditure.  
 
Appendix 1 
Guidelines for Women Component Plan (WCP) , Kerala 
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As per Government Order G.O (MS) No.17/2000/planning dated April 3rd, 
2000 the government of Kerala gave clear instructions regarding the type of 
projects to be included under Women Component Plan (WCP) during 2000-
2002. 
 
(1)  Projects like roads, latrines, electrification, and smokeless chullahs which 
have women and men both as beneficiaries need not to be included in 
WCP. However district panchayats and corporations can include housing 
schemes under WCP for women headed families which have no adult 
males. 
 
(2)  Cultivation of vegetables, goat rearing, poultry etc. should be excluded 
from WCP. If such income generating projects are included under WCP, it 
must be ensured that these units and its income a re under the full control 
of women. Funds required for food and nutrition programme of 
Anganvadis and pre-primary education programme need not to be 
included under WCP. Construction of Anganvadi buildings which have no 
separate provisions for organising meetings of women need not to 
included under WCP. 
 
(3)  As far as possible, WCP projects should be organised and implemented 
through SHGs of women, neighborhood groups and other groups and 
cooperative societies. Financial assistance for thrift and credit schemes of 
BPL families, which are nominated by Kudumbasree, self help group and 
neighborhood groups are to be included under WCP. 
 
(4)  Special consideration should be given for projects that aim at 
development of infrastructure facility, marketing facility and 
enterpreneurship programme for development of micro enterprises owned 
by women under WCP. 
 
(5)  Cottage industries for women promoted by the industries Department can 
be given financial assistance under WCP, subject to prevailing norms.  
 
(6)  Gram panchayats and municipalities can take up projects for  
        comprehensive study of status of women in their respective areas under  
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Endnotes 
                                                                   
1  A few related literature were on Mexico, Morocco, The Philippines and 
South Africa. For details, refer Rao, M Govinda and Chakraborty, L S (2006), 
Chakraborty, L. S. and Bagchi, Amaresh (2007)  and Chakraborty (2006a, 
2006b). 
2 The emphasis on Kerala experience in the paper is therefore 
irreproachable, as compared to the critical assessment of available civil 
society initiatives in other two states in fiscal decentralisation and gender 
budgeting. Yet another point to be noted here is that within the limited 
attempts of fiscally decentralised gender budgeting across the globe, Kerala 
experience stands out due to the unique features of its institutionalisation 
and the ex-ante process of integrating  spatial gender needs in budgeting 
reflecting the voices of women in the jurisdictions.  
3 NIPFP's involvement in Gender Responsive Budgeting resulted in its first 
visible outcome in terms of inclusion of a chapter on ‘gender inequality’ in the 
Economic Survey of India, 2000-2001 (a document prepared by the Ministry 
of Finance placed before Parliament annually a day before the Union Budget 
of India is announced). This section was based on the interim report on 
Gender Budgeting prepared by NIPFP.  The NIPFP study encompasses the 
diagnosis of the existing degree of gender-inequality in India through gender-
segregation of relevant macrodata, quantification of unpaid care economy 
work of women that remains outside the SNA, econometric investigation of 
the link between public expenditure and gender development, budgetary 
policies through a gender lens and identification of policy alternatives to 
build-in a gender-sensitive national budgeting process (Lahiri, Ashok; 
Chakraborty, Lekha and Bhattacharryya, P N, 2003).   
4In Philippines, it is interesting to note that under the  quota-based gender 
budgeting, money was earmarked even for ballroom dancing in certain 
departments. Also, as there was no penalty for not utilising the GAD budget 
fully and efficiently, many of the departments ended up with unspent surplus 
in the GAD budget (for details, Chakraborty, Lekha S, 2006b).  
5 Stotsky (2006) and Lahiri, Chakraborty and Bhattacharrya (2003) have 
succinctly discussed HDI, GDI and GEM in their works on gender budgeting.  
For further details, refer technical notes on HDI, GDI and GEM in Human 
Development Reports of UNDP. The HDI consists of three equally weighted 
components to come up with an aggregate score for each country: income at 
purchasing power parity, adult literacy and years of schooling, and life 
expectancy. The first component provides a proxy for the level of welfare. 
The second provides a proxy for measures of human capital, and the third for 
measures of health status. By design, the value of the HDI ranges from 0 to 
1, where 1 indicates the highest level of well-being. The disparity between 
the HDI and other income-based measures of progress suggest the 
importance at looking at several dimensions of wellbeing in constructing a 
summary measure. In 1995, the UNDP b egan presenting two indicators of 
well-being that focus on gender for the purpose of measuring the extent of 
gender inequalities and changes over time (UNDP, 1995). The derivation of 
these indexes is premised on the theoretical notion developed in Anand and 
Sen (1995) that, ceteris paribus, societies have an aversion to gender 
inequality. These indexes are constructed so that they also range in value for   32 
                                                                                                                                               
each country from 0 to 1, where values closer to 1 indicate higher levels of 
women’s well-being and empowerment relative to men. The difference 
between the GDI and HDI for a country reflects not only the magnitude of the 
gender gap but also the penalty that applies to this gap. This penalty is 
calculated by constructing the so-called equally distributed equivalent 
achievement (EDEA), which is defined as the level of achievement that, if 
attained equally by women and men, would be judged to be exactly as 
valuable socially as the actually observed achievement (Anand and Sen, 
1995). An example is the level of literacy that, if achieved equally by 
everyone, would yield the same social valuation as one showing a particular 
gender gap. The formula depends on a parameter, the aversion to inequality, 
for which a larger value implies a greater penalty for gender gaps.  If the 
aversion to inequality were zero, then the EDEA would be the weighted 
mean of the male and female levels, which is equal to the average level of 
achievement in the HDI. Any value of the parameter greater than zero leads 
to an EDEA below the weighted mean. For the UNDP report, the value of this 
parameter was taken to be 2 for all three gender gaps. The second index, 
which is constructed in a similar manner, relates to political equality and is 
termed the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). The GEM examines the 
ability to participate in economic and political life. It uses indicators based on 
per capita income, the share of jobs classified as professional and technical, 
and administrative and managerial, going to women and men, and the share 
of parliamentary seats going to women and men (discussion from Stotsky, 
2006). 
6 Empirical literature draws attention to these efficiency dimensions of 
integrating gender perspective into macroeconomic policies.  For example, 
the striking good mother thesis noted that women tend to have a higher 
marginal propensity to spend than men on goods that enhance the 
capabilities of children. Evidence suggests that the likelihood of children 
being enrolled in school goes up with their mother’s educational level, and 
the mother’s extra income has more positive impact on household 
investments in nutrition, health and education of children than extra income 
accruing to fathers. Also, literature on gender inequality in the labour market 
shows that eliminating gender discrimination in occupation and wages could 
increase not only women’s income, but also national income. 
7 NIPFP methodology of categorising the public expenditure in terms of 
gender has been adopted in two South Asian countries, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the study done by Chakraborty, L (2002) has been 
translated into vernacular languages and used it as an analytical basis to 
conduct gender budgeting. Government of India accepted NIPFP 
methodology to undertake this exercise at subnational governments in India.  
8  Instead, NIPFP’s suggestion of gender budgeting in PRES classification 
(categorising gender-related public expenditure into Protective, Regulatory, 
Economic and Social  (PRES) services) has been adopted by national and 
subnational governments due to the simplicity in its application to the existing 
classification of expenditure budgets. Under PRES framework, public 
expenditure can be categorised into four clusters. First, there are protective 
and welfare services that are important to prevent the atrocities against 
women such as domestic violence, rape, kidnapping, dowry deaths including   33 
                                                                                                                                               
rehabilitation programmes. All citizens irrespective of caste, creed, or sex 
enjoy the benefits of public expenditure on the maintenance of law and order 
and dispensation of justice and their consumption is “non-rival” in nature. 
Still, such expenditure has got a gender dimension as women and children 
are more vulnerable to social stress and violence. Second, there are 
regulatory services for women, in particular, the institutional mechanism 
like National Commission for Women. Third, there are  economic services 
such as self-employment and training programmes, economic empowerment 
programmes and fuel supply management programmes, which can provide 
economic empowerment for women. Fourth, there are  social services such 
as education, water supply and sanitation, housing, health and nutrition 
schemes, which can empower women to play their rightful role in the 
economy. Studies revealed that major part of gender-related public 
expenditure in India belongs to Protective and Welfare Services; leaving 
most negligible allocation for economic services (NIPFP, 2003; Chakraborty, 
L 2003).  
9 For details on policy series of ex-post analysis of gender budgeting, NIPFP 
(2002), Chakraborty, L (2003) and Chakraborty (2006).  
10 The expert group was under the chairmanship of Chief Economic Advisor 
of India, Ashok Lahiri and the report is posted in  www.cgaindia.org/pdf/ 
Classification%20Report.pdf ; Section II of the report is on gender budgeting.  
11 Refer Expenditure Budget, 2005-06. It was also noted that Department of 
Women and Child Development (DWCD) and NIPFP would be undertaking a 
review of the public expenditure profile of  the departments of Rural 
Development, Health and Family Welfare, Labour, Elementary Education, 
Small Scale Industries, Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation, Social 
Justice and Empowerment and Tribal Affairs, through a gender lens; conduct 
sex disaggregated benefit incidence analysis (BIA) and recommend specific 
changes in the operational guidelines of various development schemes so as 
to improve the coverage of women beneficiaries of the public expenditures. 
Subsequently, NIPFP developed a Working Paper titled “Gender Budgeting 
in Selected Ministries: Conceptual and Methodological Issues” and based on 
this Working Paper, DWCD organised two workshops for the selected 
ministries for training in gender budgeting. For details,  Chakraborty, Lekha S 
(2005a). 
12 Refer Chakraborty, L (2006c) for details.  
13 These indices also fail to capture the ‘efficiency’ argument underlying the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
14 This is the combined autonomy ratio of both urban and rural local 
governments. The ratio turns out to be even lower if only the rural local 
bodies are considered. 
15 In Karnataka, Section 199 of Karnataka Panchayat Act, 1993 empowers 
the gram panchayats (GPs) to levy taxes on specified bases subject to a 
specified maximum e.g., the tax on land and buildings not subject to 
agricultural assessment within the  panchayat area limits. The GPs also have 
the power to levy other taxes like entertainment tax, vehicles tax. However 
these taxes are rarely levied as administrative costs exceed the revenue 
accretion. Fee charged on water supply is the major non-tax source of 
revenue. With regard to intergovernmental transfers, by the  Panchayat Act   34 
                                                                                                                                               
the state government is required to constitute a State Finance Commission 
(SFC) once in five years to review the financial position of the ZPs, TPs and 
GPs and to make recommendations on the sharing of state taxes, 
assignment of revenues and forwarding  of grants from the Consolidated 
Fund of the State Government. In Kerala, tax revenue has an own source 
component and a state component, the latter consisting of assigned taxes 
(basic tax on land and a four-percent surcharge on stamp duty collected 
under the provisions of the Kerala Stamp Act) and shared tax (the share for 
GPs called vehicle tax compensation). The assigned and shared taxes are 
officially referred to as ‘statutory grant’. Own taxes of the GP include property 
tax, profession tax, entertainment tax, advertisement tax, service tax and 
show tax, with the last three adding up to insignificant amounts. Apart from 
the statutory grants, the GP’s receive non-plan state grants, plan grants and 
central grants. In terms of revenue powers, own tax constitutes only 5 
percent of the total revenue of PRIs in West Bengal. The own revenue 
resources of the state has been very low; the negligible sources of revenue 
has been tax on land and buildings and stamp duty on property transfers 
along with user charges from water, fee for registration of vehicles, license 
fee for markets etc. The SFC of West Bengal has not recommended any 
major additionalities to the own revenue sources of the PRIs. However, SFC 
recommendations in terms of devolution of finance has created a qualitative 
change in the nature of grants to local bodies by reversing the nature of 
grants from tied to increasingly untied grants, thereby giving more autonomy 
to the PRIs.  
16 A notable feature is the multiplicity of transfer channels from the center to 
the states. First, there is a constitutional mechanism to devolve tax shares 
and give grants. Second, the Planning Commission give s grants and loans 
for implementing development plans. Finally, various ministries give grants to 
their counterparts in the states for specific projects which are either wholly 
funded by the centre (central sector projects) or requiring the states to share 
a proportion of the cost (centrally sponsored schemes) (Rao and Singh, 
1998). Moreover, there is a lack of coordination among the three current 
institutions in charge of implementing transfers. 
17 But the major problem of working out the devolution criteria on the basis of 
per capita income at the local level is the paucity of data on per capita 
income below the district level. Still it is quite likely that local bodies under 
the jurisdiction of a particular district with higher per capita income would be 
economically better off than the local bodies under the jurisdiction of a district 
with lower per capita income. In that case district level per capita income 
could be used as a proxy variable of per capita income at the local level 
(Lekha S. 1997). 
18 Studies also noted that public infrastructure investment affects market 
work, non-market work and leisure time in different ways with evident gender 
differentials. The time allocation in SNA activity of women is found significant 
and inversely related to the public infrastructure in water supply 
(Chakraborty, L 2005). 
19 Amartya Sen set off a debate when he estimated that there are 100 million 
‘missing women’ in the world;  India has the dubious distinction of having the 
largest share. This magnitude of female survival disadvantage is far from a   35 
                                                                                                                                               
minor issue. Studies noted that it ranks among the worst human 
catastrophes of the twentieth century as it is larger than the combined 
casualties of all famines in the twentieth century and it also exceeds the 
combined death toll of both world wars and the casualties of major epidemics 
including the currently ongoing AIDS pandemic.  Using fixed effects model of 
pooled least squares for the last four decennial census data across fifteen 
major states in India, study reveals t hat higher socio-economic 
characteristics,  viz., female literacy, female labour participation rate and 
economic growth, has not been translated effectively in terms of containing 
the female survival disadvantage.  The disaggregated panel data analysis by 
geographic units reveals that lower juvenile sex ratio is not an isolated 
phenomenon of rural India, rather matter is dismal in urban units. 
(Chakraborty, L and Sinha, 2006).  
20 However, if it is felt that the mandate of adhering to the 1971 population 
would stand in the way, then the population weights can be split into two 
halves and one half assigned to the number of females or, better still, female 
children (Bagchi and Chakraborty, 2004). 
21 A quick review of SFCs through a gender lens revealed that no SFC has 
effectively integrated gender concerns in their reports. Among the three 
states under concern, only Kerala has explored the scope of conducting 
gender budgeting at the third tier. However, the attempt has remained 
outside the purview of SFC of Kerala. SFCs are required to make 
recommendations on the assignment of tax revenues to local bodies, sharing 
of tax revenues between States and the local governments and their 
distribution among individual local bodies as also grants. The experience of 
implementation of SFC across states however depicts a disappointing picture 
as many states are reluctant to devolve revenue and expenditure powers to 
third level governments (Rao, 2005). Some States have devolved functions 
and functionaries and finances, but the functions have been capsulated in 
terms of schemes in the interest of transferred employees and local 
governments do not have the autonomy in either changing the schemes or to 
exit. Yet another problem at the third tier is that as the salary of the devolved 
functionaries are paid by the state and their transfers and promotions are 
decided by the state government, the local governments cannot effectively 
ensure their accountability. Further the twin dangers of elite capture and 
corruption need to be resolved in many States.  
22 This point has its roots in the discussions by Gulati (1987).  
23 In 1996, a coalition (Left Democratic Front) of left parties returned to power 
in the state of Kerala and immediately fulfilled one of its most important 
campaign pledges by launching the “People’s Campaign for Decentralised 
Planning” (Isaac and Franke, 2000). 
24 Thus going by the traditional literature, Kerala’s decentralisation takes the 
form of “devolution” as opposed to the moderate  “deconcentration” or an 
essentially right wing “delegation”. Here, authority is transferred to 
autonomous or semi-autonomous local governments, giving them powers to 
plan, make decisions, raise revenues, employ staff, and monitor activities. In 
the Kerala people’s campaign, devolution was used  as the administrative 
mechanism of decentralisation, but the international significance lies in   36 
                                                                                                                                               
Kerala’s attempt to make devolution large-scale, democratic, participatory, 
activist, egalitarian, empowering, self-reflective, self-reliant, and sustainable. 
25 For details of GDI and GEM, refer UNDP Human Development Reports, 
Technical Notes.  
26 Though women far exceed men in graduate and post-graduate courses in 
arts and sciences, they lag far behind them in professional/technical 
education except in ‘softer’ p rofessions like teaching. Educated 
unemployment is the most serious problem for women in Kerala. Unable to 
procure jobs commensurate with their skills and preferences (which are often 
shaped by social contexts), many of them are choosing to remain 
unemployed. The occupational structure suggests that although female 
share of organised sector employment is high (owing to higher literacy) in 
Kerala  vis-à-vis the other Indian states, most of these women are located at 
the lower end of professional hierarchy.  
27 The term gram sabha refers to village assembly. Functions of the  gram 
sabha include (1) mobilising voluntary labour and voluntary contributions in 
cash and kind for community works; (2) identifying beneficiaries of anti-
poverty and village development schemes; (3) assisting the implementation 
of village development schemes; (4) making recommendations on annual 
accounts, administrative report, report on development programme and audit 
report of the panchayats etc. 
28 An obvious factor here was the insufficient representation of women 
among trained resource persons. This problem has been directly addressed 
in subsequent rounds of training. As women activists and representatives 
have started playing a proactive and informed role in the campaign, the 
effectiveness, content and scope of the WCP has improved. 
29 The share of grant-in-aid set apart for WCP rose to 11 percent, more 
realistic patterns on financing the projects were adopted, the quality of 
projects improved and new forms of women’s development organisations 
such as self-help groups emerged (Isaac and Franke, 2000). 
30 Practical gender needs do not entail to the strategic goal such as women’s 
emancipation or gender equality. Practical gender needs include food, 
shelter, community-level requirements of basic services or basic 
infrastructure like roads, water and sanitation which are required by all the 
family, not the women alone.  Strategic gender needs are identified to 
overcome women’s subordination, which in turn depends on particular 
cultural and socio-political context. Strategic needs include abolition of 
sexual division of labour, alleviation of the burden of domestic labour, child 
care, removal of institutional forms of discrimination such as, rights to own 
land or property, access to credit, measures against domestic violence, 
establishment of political equality.  
31 Fan, Hazell and Thorat (1999) 
32 Decentralisation initiatives in Karnataka could be traced to as early as 
1862 when the “local fund” was established in each district to construct roads 
and other public utilities. The post independence initiative includes the report 
of the Local Boards Enquiry Committee (1954) which recommended a three-
tier structure at the district, taluk and village level. After the reorganisation of 
the state in 1956, a need was felt for standardising the varying patterns of 
local governments in different regions and this led to the Mysore Village   37 
                                                                                                                                               
panchayats and  Local Board Act (1959). The Act assigned executive 
functions to the Village  panchayats  and  taluk development boards with 
district development councils assigned an advisory role. The most important 
initiative towards decentralisation was taken with the enactment of the 
Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samitis, Mandal Panchayat and 
Nyaya Panchayat Act of 1983. The Act was implemented from 1987 onwards 
and it helped to evolve a two-tier structure of decentralisation. While the zilla 
parishads (district level) and mandal panchayats had the executive authority, 
the intermediary tier of taluk panchayat samitis had only a co-ordinating role. 
Since 1993, Karnataka has been a forerunner in the decentralisation reforms 
initiated in the country in 1992. In fact the state’s experience has influenced 
national level thinking on the empowerment of rural local governments. 
Against this backdrop, a World Bank sponsored study done by Rao,  et. al. 
(2004) compiled and analysed the fiscal data on the 175  taluk panchayats, 
27 zilla panchayats, and 636 gram panchayats  out of a total of 5659 GPs in 
the state.  
33 A project—Building B udgets from Below —was funded by UNIFEM and 
carried out by the Karnataka Women’s Information and Resource Centre 
(KWIRC) in 2002. The pilot project addressed the following issues–how to 
draw the most appropriate benefits from budget to women, how to give them 
agency, that is, the power and the place in the structure of governance that 
would enable them to direct the local economy to serve their choices. In 
effect it was an action research project conducted in three phases, which 
investigated the extent of freedom available to women elected to self-
government bodies to determine local fiscal policies. The areas selected for 
the study were (a) dry land (not developed) in North Karnataka: 
Honaganahalli Gram Panchayat in Bijapur district; (b) dry land (average 
developed) in Mid Karnataka: Kogalli Gram Panchayat in Bellary district; © 
well developed with good social indicators in SouthWest Karnataka: Udupi 
City Municipal Council / Average developed in South East Karnataka: 
Tumkur City Municipal Council and (d) d eveloped with fairly good social 
indicators in South Karnataka: Mysore City Corporation. 
34 Planning at the village level is restricted to allocating the available funds 
for spillover works. The prepared budget is then sent to the TPs for scrutiny 
and consolidation. Every August the finance department of the state 
government indicates the total grants to be given. The ZPs then allocate this 
to the 23 major heads after consultation with the heads of their line 
departments who in turn consult the official at the  taluk level. After 
consolidation by the finance department, the plan proposals are then placed 
before the Finance and Planning Committee. Next the draft annual plan is 
placed before the governing body of the ZP. The proposals are then included 
in the “Link Document” after approval from the state planning department. 
35 Zilla parishads  at the district level, anchalik parishads at the Block level, 
Anchal Parishads at the Union (group of villages) level and the  gram 
panchayat at the village level. 
36 Published as “Gender in Fiscal Policies: The case of West Bengal” by the 
UNIFEM, the study initially dealt with the need for institutional response to 
the existing gender bias in West Bengal. This was followed by a detailed 
analysis of the budgetary situation in West Bengal  vis-à-vis other Indian   38 
                                                                                                                                               
states in the 1990’s. The study also examined the public schemes for women 
in the state budget; with special reference to state education policies from a 
gender perspective. The period of the study refers to the decade after the 
official setting in of the new economic policies–an event, that was supposed 
to have an impact on the finances of the centre as well as the states and 
welfare of the people at large. Classifying schemes as (1) Relief schemes; 
(2) gender-reinforcing schemes; (3) equity promoting schemes; and (4) 
Equality promoting schemes, the study found that West Bengal had so far 
taken little initiative to promote true gender equality. Outlays on equality 
promoting schemes (meant as a special aid to remove women’s handicaps) 
were dismally low. Bulk of the budgetary resources in the social sector went 
to traditional welfare services with an implicit assumption about the non-
existence of any gender bias in the access to these resources. Another 
significant part of the budget was for schemes for women in their traditional 
roles of reproducers and caregivers. Thus although the constitutional 
directive of not denying women equal access to all public facilities has been 
carried out, the barriers preventing women from exploiting these facilities 
remain largely unaddressed.  When the above classification was applied to 
the state education budget, several grey areas were found e.g., though the 
budget mentions schemes for hostels for Muslim girls or appointment of 
women teachers in educationally backward areas, the actual budgetary 
allocation for these schemes was either absent or negligible. Absence of 
even primary schools in large number of habitations in West Bengal implied 
a relative scarcity of female teachers, which again was responsible for the 
high drop-out rates of girls at primary levels.  The analysis broadly shows 
that public education expenditure of the state of West Bengal has been 
largely insensitive to the special needs of women.  Classifying expenditures 
on education and health (budget heads) by economic categories the study 
found that almost the entire amount went for wages and salaries to the staff 
– the share went up during the 90s. This left very little for expansion or 
improvement of services. 
37 Excerpts of discussions with Banerjee. 